MAINE PERMIT BANK OPENS continued from Home Page
The fishermen strongly urged the Council to protect fleet diversity by limiting the accumulation of permit ownership and limiting further fleet consolidation.
Catch share management is four months into the year and fleet consolidation is taking its toll. Both NMFS and the Council were explicit in their intent to reduce fleet capacity. However, lacking a long-term fleet vision, the Council was not explicit in how to reduce fleet capacity. On one hand consolidation may lead to a groundfishery controlled by a few absentee owners with limited regard for the long-term health of our fish stocks. On the other hand consolidation may lead to a future for both small boats and big boats, inshore and offshore fishermen, hook fishermen, gillnetters, draggers, and above all – a future for fishing communities. At June’s Council meeting fishermen weighed in.
“…It is a well known fact that Catch Share systems in almost all other countries have led to fewer, larger boats. This sort of fleet would only benefit a select few, and I believe that it would lead to more habitat destruction – bigger boats with greater towing capabilities – will be able to tow over anything in their way…. If you honestly care about the fish stocks and future of our greatly diverse fishing fleet, please consider some form of safety measures to ensure its survival.” – Massachusetts fisherman, June 23 Council Testimony
Communities that care about “who fishes” emphasize the Magnuson Stevens Act (MSA), which calls for protections and safeguards for fishermen and their shoreside communities. They emphasize the goals set forth in Amendment 16, which call for fleet diversity and protections against excessive consolidation. And they emphasize cautionary tales of nearby fisheries that are now consolidated into a few large corporations.* Despite all the signs and guiding rules, when it comes down to it, the Council justifies the socio-economic shortcomings with one trump card, MSA National Standard number 1, which requires that Council prevent overfishing.
The Council’s line of thinking goes like this: The priority is to prevent overfishing. In order to prevent overfishing the fleet must consolidate. If the fleet self-consolidates we will be left with the most economically efficient boats. Economically efficient boats reap the most fish at the cheapest cost and feed the most people. Sound good?
But one must ask, why in the name of saving the fish, are we displacing the most environmentally efficient boats – those whose scale match the scale of the ecology – only to be replaced by the largest industrial-scale boats? This couldn’t be what the writers of National Standards 1 had in mind. Is economic efficiency the best way to go?
The same argument was made 30 years ago in support of the industrial-scale farming model. For over three decades poor policies forced family farmers off the land in the name of consolidation, industrialization, and global exports. Today, the same poor policies are forcing community-based fishermen out of the sea.
The big-time players who advocated for industrialization in the farm world argued that consolidation would result in the most economically efficient farm operations. Policy makers agreed that business models with the lowest cost of production were good for our economy and good for consumers. Therefore, the argument went, the least efficient small and medium-sized farms had to go because they wouldn’t be able to provide the mass quantities of food needed to feed the world. No one asked ‘cheap food at what cost?’
What we know now, mostly due to hindsight, is that advocating the most economically efficient model only makes sense when all other variables are equal. As it turns out, the overall impact of small-scale farms and industrial-scale farms are not equal. We learned that industrial-scale farming came with huge economic, ecological, health, and community consequences. Policy makers made the mistake of not recognizing that “who farms matters” and now our communities, health, and our land ecology are paying the cost.
Fishermen at June’s Council meeting insisted that “who fishes matters” and offered alternative solutions.
“I am equally as concerned about the future of the fish stocks as I am about the future of our fleets. Permits and histories have already begun to enter a completely new arena that we have never witnessed before, which in effect, will mean our industry will soon be owned and controlled by large conglomerates who have no real interest or stake in the future of the industry, rather only the bottom line of their investment. To have our industry controlled by copious investors is to risk destroying the benefits of all of the hard work that both NOAA and the fishing industry have spent years trying to build, and ultimately, only exhaust the oceans of their sustainability….” – New Hampshire fisherman, June 23 Council testimony.
“I am writing this because of my concern that groundfish sectors will eliminate diversity in our fleet …. If safeguards are not put in place now we will see the quota migrate toward large vessels till there are ten boats catching 90 percent of the fish. I believe an easy way of safeguarding this is to keep our qualifying baseline tied to the catch entitlement…. I would like to ask the question, Why were the baseline requirements eliminated?” – New York fisherman, June 23 Council testimony
In fact, baseline leasing was in place for the past 15 years under Days at Sea (DAS) Management. Baseline leasing existed to control effort capacity and preserve fleet diversity by preventing the funneling upwards of fishing rights toward large-scale boats. It actually functioned as a mechanism to prevent excessive consolidation.
The way baseline leasing worked (and still does today for the Common Pool) was that boat X could not lease to another boat above 20 percent of boat X’s engine horsepower and 10 percent of its length. This formula also kept costs low for permits and leasing. Under Amendment 16, this protection was eliminated.
But that was not the only protection eliminated under Amendment 16. Under Amend- ment 13 to the Groundfish plan there was a 20 percent maximum quota share that prevented excessive consolidation. The 2006 MSA instructed councils to ensure that no person or entity acquires excessive shares of the quota. This restriction was removed in Amendment 16 and currently there is no ownership cap for individuals or corporations.
“I love what I do and I have had several opportunities to buy more quota but have been outbid by larger capacity boat owners. It has only been two months and the bigger boats are already buying up the smaller boats’ catch shares. I feel that it is very important that some sort of mechanism be put into place that would prohibit one entity from owning a large percent of the quota, whether it is current baseline restrictions or some other strategy….” – Massachusetts fisherman, June 23 Council testimony
Fishermen from around New England have asserted loud and clear that if we are to protect the ecosystem and fishing communities, then mechanisms must be established to ensure fleet diversity and prevent excessive consolidation. A consolidated fleet of the most economically efficient large-scale boats will undermine conservation goals and ultimately National Standards 1. We know there is a better way forward.
About the authors:
Brett Tolley is the community organizer and policy advocate for the Northwest Atlantic Marine Alliance.
Aaron Dority is the Downeast Groundfish Initiative Project Director for the Penobscot East Resource Center.
Phil Karlin is a commercial fisherman based out of Mattituck, NY.
*In the Atlantic Surf Clam/Ocean Quahog fishery within five years of its ITQ implementation the industry was dominated by companies like Borden, KPMG Peat Marwich, and the National Westminster Bank of New Jersey, wholly-owned subsidiary of National Westminster Bank, a leading international banking group based in the United Kingdom.