The boundaries were not uniform, but were sight-specific, following a reef or a hole—an ecosystem—more than an invisible line on a map. These lines continued to evolve, as did the communities around them. Population shifts, species value, fishing pressure… all of these things affected the boundaries and the management complexity. By 1874, one area of Nahagusuku Bay was shared by as many as seven different fishermen’s associations. The associations largely governed themselves and their territories, with the national government interfering only to hand down broad rules, licenses, rights, and some conservation measures. The associations then determined allocations, sea-space usage and gear types; typically, the associations’ rules would supersede that of the national regulator’s. The exact methodology used by the different associations is massive in scope, and precariously documented, but it is known that many observed ancient genealogical ties and social hierarchies / pressures. In the wake of WWII, with its democratic pursuits, came the 1948 Fisheries Cooperative Associations Act, which formally created the Fisheries Cooperative Associations (FCAs) for coastal or near-shore fisheries (within a 25 kilometer zone—not offshore and distant-water fisheries) that still exist today. FCAs are democratically-run groups with elected officers that manage a given territory and its fishermen. Simply put, in order to fish, one must be a member of the local FCA. The following year, 1949, brought an update to the 1901 Fisheries Law. The new Fisheries Law strived to eradicate any lingering feudalistic notions within the fisheries. It gave rights and licenses only to active fishermen, which meant an end to any lord-serf relationships (these lords were known as “Sealords”), thus allowing fishermen to fish entirely for themselves. The 1949 update also gave administration rights to the FCAs, and created Sea Area Fishery Adjustment Committees, one for each FCA, which would create plans for fishing grounds and usage. All fishing rights and licenses were then owned exclusively by the local FCAs, and were non-transferable and non-leasable. These rights and licenses were shared by the FCA members. Further, the FCAs interpret, implement, and enforce national laws; but many of the members remain ignorant to these goings-on, and operate only according to the FCA and their local customs. The entire FCA group is referred to as the General Assembly. Typically numbering an average 500 fishermen, the General Assemblies meet annually to discuss regulations, both national and local; resolve problems or issues; and elect officials such as a president, vice president, and advisors. The elected officials are usually professional administrators capable of the duties and responsibilities inherent in such a position. The notes from the General Assembly meetings then serve as a “rule book” for that year. Within a given FCA’s territory exists several smaller territories, known as “spots,” which are set aside for conservation closures, specific gear types, or even individually inherited areas. The higher-productivity spot may induce a lottery in order to fish it, but typically the “first come, first serve” practice is paramount. Membership was dictated by the laws of ’48 and ’49, which say that while rights and licenses are non-transferable, they can be handed down to kin or inherited through a rigorous apprenticeship. The ability to enter a fishery varies greatly around Japan, and the typical apprenticeship involves years of fishing alongside one’s father or other kinfolk, and being an associate member (nonvoting) of the FCA until the father either retires or dies. The vast majority of conflicts in these coastal fisheries are resolved by the respective FCAs and communities, with theft, for example, punished by both monetary compensation and social defacement. The FCAs carry a massive amount of power and influence in the communities, with pride and tradition as major motivators. But modernization and the increased value of seafood have potentially weakened the integrity and power of the social forces. Problems that cannot be handled by the FCA—or that involve multiple FCAs, such as boundary disputes—national help is sought. These ancient parameters have served Japan well over its long years. Serving multiple roles, these community based management tactics successfully combine social, economic, and environmental aspects into one inseparable entity. This allows for a more effective and efficient governing process, one that is less expensive, more immediate, and more respected. The FCAs actively participate in what they dictate, and therefore concern themselves with local knowledge as well as issues. The typical American fisherman’s meeting—which stages small boat fishermen alongside corporate lawyers and government regulators—does not exist there. The FCAs have the time and need to cater to the community, from the creation of credit facilities to schools, from setting aside areas for aging fishermen to establishing supply networks, the FCAs provide the support and power of many coastal communities. So deeply ingrained are the fishermen’s rights to earn a living that threats to that way of life—such as coastal development—demand compensation. Since Japan’s peak harvest in the mid-eighties, the offshore and distant-water fisheries have been steadily declining, while the nearshore fisheries have maintained. According to the 2000 census, of Japan’s 280,000 total fishermen, 240,000 were coastal. Of that 240,000, 200,000, or 83%, were self-employed. Japan’s fisheries associations, created over thousands of years, combining democratic and feudalistic components, have come to be a model for fisheries around the world—including Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs). For the most part, however the United States has been slow to accept these principles — with the notable exception of the Maine lobsterman. Scholars and regulators alike are beginning to draw parallels between the Maine lobstermen’s social structures and the Japanese FCAs — with one of the major similarities being the undeniable success of both fisheries.
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