AS MAGNUSON UNFOLDS from page 1                                May 2007  
“The devil is in the details.” —Terry Stockwell. With the translation of the MSA pending, how to proceed on MSA, the budget up in the air, consolidation looming, the threat to local control from the industrial fleet palpable, uncharted waters comes to mind. Knowing there may be nothing to manage after a sweep by the big boats, local control advocates are scrambling to stake a claim. Photo: Fishermen's Voice
Proponents of quota systems say that the seas are a typical case of “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Fishermen are out to catch as many fish as they can, and since the sea does not belong to individuals—but to everybody—they aren’t motivated to care for it as they would if it were their own. If one fisherman doesn’t catch the fish, another will. A single fisherman’s actions are not immediately visible, and therefore no fisherman is individually responsible.

Further, the government is the body charged with regulating this common ground, and with the NMFS saying that the fisheries are 60% overfished, it’s obvious that the regulations have proved unsuccessful.
Privatization of the seas, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) hopes, will change this. LAPPs will hopefully allow for a more streamlined system that will maintain the well being of the fisheries.

The Quota System
There are environmentalists, major corporations, sport fishermen, government agencies, processors, some fishermen, regulators, who back the quota system. They hope LAPPs will stomp-out overfishing, put an end to the unpopular Days at Sea (DAS) program, and simultaneously end dangerous “derby fishing”—the race to catch as many fish as possible in a limited amount of time, no matter the weather conditions.

Only species that are currently managed under the Limited Access program will be immediately eligible for LAPPs. The eight regional management councils beneath the NMFS, such as the New England Fisheries Management Council, will establish a biologically-based, sustainable Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for each of these federally managed species, and percentages of that TAC will be allocated to the fishermen. The division of the TAC will be based on each vessel’s landing history. And so the quota holders become “owners” of a share in their fishery.

Once allocated quotas, fishermen will be able to buy or sell them as they desire. The fishermen who want to fish could buy more shares, amassing a wealth in the resource; others could simply sell their shares and be done with it. The result of this allocation system, supporters hope, will be less boats and less gear operating at a more efficient, safe, and sustainable manner.

The new Magnuson does not establish any Processor Quotas (PQ)—where certain processors are allocated a percentage of the catch—but the regional councils will have the ability to do so as they create their regional plans. Processors will, however, be able to purchase harvest quota alongside the fishermen.

Regulators say that the quota system can be designed to meet the specific needs and goals of each fishery, by each regional management council. If the herring fishery needs consolidation, that could be achieved via quotas, as could the perpetuation of a small boat fishery for another species. Ranging from ITQs to CBFM, from corporate privatization to community ownership, LAPPs are as expansive as they are controversial.

But Does it Work? And Who Does it Work For?
At the heart of the concern about quota-based programs like LAPPs, lies consolidation. To some, particularly management, the word is a long awaited blessing. Consolidation means the end of a hard-to-manage, scattered fleet of vessels. In their stead will be a smaller group of more efficient vessels that fish under a known quota. The numbers will be fixed and the regional councils will know exact landings. The guesswork and chaos of the fisheries will be gone.

To others, consolidation spells not only the end of a public resource, but also the end of a job and a way of life. When a fleet is streamlined, and the biggest players are gifted the largest quotas, the small guys are ousted. A bunch of small boats are simply not as efficient—or as easy to govern—as a single large boat.

A Chatham, Massachusetts groundfisherman told a National Ocean & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) community study that ITQs would demolish him. After talking with a high liner from Alaska who came to Chatham to discuss ITQs, the Chatham fisherman said if ITQs come, he would be out of business. The ITQs will be directed toward the really big draggers. It rewards the guys who caught all the fish in the first place. They’ll be given a smaller amount, but I’ll be given a much, much smaller amount of fish to catch. I’ll end up selling my ITQ to a company or something like that.

Eugene H. Buck, a natural resources specialist for the National Council for Science and the Environment, testified to congress that ITQs “could cause substantial unemployment and socioeconomic dislocation in coastal communities.”

In the Case of Crabs
The Crab Rationalization that took place in the Bering Sea / Aleutian Islands (BSAI) has been the poster child for the anti-quota sector, which—like the proponents of quotas—range from environmental groups like Greenpeace to traditional fishermen. Established in 2005 by the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (NPFMC), rationalization has all but brought the crab fishermen and their communities to their knees. In one year’s time, the Bristol Bay red king crab fleet went from 251 vessels to just 89. In the Bering Sea, numbers dropped from 189 to 80. The brown crab fishery went from 30 to six vessels.

There is also concern that large industry has the political power to receive higher TACs than the fishery can handle, or that possible lawsuits could result from a TAC reduction. One such lawsuit was filed—but dismissed—in New Zealand, when the red snapper TAC was lowered to the chagrin of large shareholders.

Other Concerns
Beyond consolidation, many ITQ and LAPP skeptics fear that the system simply doesn’t do what it intends to: put an end to overfishing. ITQs are used for the fish of highest value, like salmon, halibut and cod. One of the benefits of ITQs is that the smaller catches will demand a higher price, thus earning the fishermen more money for less work—and leaving more fish in the sea.

But with that much money on the line, many fear that illegal practices, such as high-grading, would be all too common. Since fishermen’s catches are so limited, fishermen will want to use their quotas for the most valuable catch they can, even if this means discarding what has already been caught, such as small or damaged fish. Another concern is price dumping, which means that no one is going to use up their quotas when the market is down, and groups worry that fishermen could drop their entire catches if they hear of a drop in dock price. According to Food & Water Watch, a nonprofit consumer rights organization that challenges the corporate control and abuse of our food and water resources, an estimated 5.8 million red king crab have been dumped overboard for high-grading purposes.

Safety is another concern. Skeptics say that the dangerous conditions found with the DAS programs have not changed with existing ITQ systems. Fishermen, they say, are now going out when the processors—and the market—tell them to, no matter the conditions.

Some economists, too, worry that even the fishermen that are allocated quota may lose out under ITQ systems. In a study done at U Mass, Amherst, economist David McEvoy and his colleagues examined a hypothetical ITQ system placed on the Atlantic herring fishery. They warn that not only will the herring fishermen take a potential hit from ITQs, but also the buyers of herring will suffer a price increase—and in the Atlantic, buyers of herring are lobstermen, with 60% of herring sold for bait.

McEvoy says that, when thinking about the pros and cons of ITQs for fishermen, we need to consider the market power of the processors, which he defined as “the ability of the processors to raise the price of herring sold to lobstermen, and lower the price paid to herring fishermen. The broad concern,” he continued, “is that processors that have this kind of market power may squeeze fishermen by buying smaller quantities of fish at lower than competitive market prices.”

McEvoy said that under such an imperfect system, “the gains from ITQs may be captured by processors rather than by fishermen.”

Community Based Fishery Management
LAPPs, however, do not necessarily spell bad news for fishermen. Fishermen’s groups, like the Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen’s Association (CCCHFA), and several conservation organizations support a community-based element that could be made possible under certain quotas. Known as Community Based Fishery Management (CBFM), these programs are similar to ITQs, but instead of individuals receiving shares of the TAC, communities or associations do. Thus, the seas are not privatized for individual gain, but regionalized for the health of the community and the resource.

“In its purest form, CBFM is a system in which fishermen and their communities exercise primary responsibility for stewardship and management, including taking part in decision making on all aspects of management, such as harvesting, access, compliance, research and marketing,” said the salmon conservation group, Ecotrust. [Again, it’s really best to attribute a quote to an individual or a publication—not a group]

Peter Baker, of the CCCHFA, says that he is optimistic about the reauthorization of Magnuson-Stevens. “The bottom line idea with the new Magnuson,” he said, “is an attempt to protect communities and individual operators. It’s a good step to use allocations to protect communities, not harm them, and it’s catching on.”

“LAPPs are better than what we had before,” he added. “Having a set of national standards makes sense. From our point of view, it’s better to let the people involved make the decisions about the fishery, and for science to set the quotas.”

Back in New England
Terry Stockwell is with the Maine Department of Marine Resources (DMR) and is a New England Fisheries Management Council member. He also serves on the groundfish/monkfish/skate committee. He said that he’s not sure where things are headed in the wake of the MSA Reauthorization. “We’re trying to make sure that wherever we go isn’t worse than where we are now,” he said.

One of the largest issues in Maine is the fate of the groundfish fishery. Although groundfish ITQs have already been rejected by the Council, many fishermen fear that their futures will match that of many Alaskan fishermen—or that they’ll fall back into the default DAS reduction, which would further limit their days.

Stockwell said that they’re working to figure plans that will fit under the framework set by the recent Magnuson. “The agency [NFMS] wants accountability and what’s bureaucratically efficient for them. To us, it’s jobs and a way of life. We have to balance.”

“Consolidation is always a concern,” he continued. “From this perspective, small boats and communities are part of our heritage. But we’ve seen a lot of consolidation recently. The Days at Sea allows for consolidation, so we have it already.”

“Some fisheries will go to ITQs,” said Baker. “But I don’t think we’ll see them in New England.”

At the top of both Baker’s and Stockwell’s list is the “sector” program. The program, a version of CBFM similar to the Maine Lobsterman’s Association, divides the fisheries into geographic sections. These sections are managed by groups of local fishermen and community members (such as CCCHFA) who work beneath a given TAC. The TAC is split between these sectors, and then each sector divides its quota among its fishermen. Thus, the group of fishermen becomes a sort of local governing body—called a sector. The locally controlled nature of sectors allows for a geography-based, multi-species approach to management, instead of the currently failing species-specific form of regulation.

As examples of possible sectors, Stockwell said that areas such as Port Clyde and the Portland Fish Exchange could work.

“The sectors to me are intriguing,” said Stockwell. “They will allow for the industry to stay within the annual catch limits of Magnuson, and fishermen to make a living at the same time.”

“But,” he added, “the million dollar question is how many sectors could fit in specific areas.”

“We think the sector allocations are the best examples of CBFMs,” said Baker, whose association is a gear-specific sector. “It’s a fairly new and growing idea. The one-size-fits-all approach hasn’t worked—for communities or business.”

Also known as Dedicated Access Privileges (DAPs) or Territorial Use Right Fisheries (TURF), versions of sectors have been used successfully in Southeast Asia for decades. Japan and Chile have also implemented their own versions of TURFs. TURFs vary from DAPs or other versions of CBFM in that they are specifically designed to be territory-based instead of species-based, thus allowing local fishermen to manage a local ecosystem, similar to sectors.

“Councils dealing with LAPPs have to be really careful in how they do it,” said Baker. “Owner/operators, communities, and individuals need a voice. To the extent that the recent Magnuson promotes that, I see it as a good thing.”

Public scoping meetings are currently being held in Maine to get feedback on the sector programs, but implementation is still a long way off—a final ruling will hopefully come by the end of the year, with an implementation date sometime in 2009.

“It’s a long and complicated process, beginning with an E.I.S (Environmental Impact Statement),” said Stockwell. “It’s a big deal and in order to have it done, it’s going to have to be well thought out. Everything moves at the speed of a glacier.”

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