In Japan, coastal fisheries resources are managed by over 1,200 fisheries cooperatives throughout the island. Each of these cooperatives has their own by-laws defined by national fishery laws and fisheries cooperative laws. This legal system empowers the cooperatives to exercise property rights over fishery resources within their jurisdiction. Access to territorial boundaries is limited to members of cooperatives, and the cooperatives all establish regulations concerning boats, gear, time and length of the season, fishing areas, mesh sizes, as well as the marketing of catch. Some would look at the Japanese system and argue that the reason why the CBFM works is because it’s basically an evolution of their ancient feudal system. But the truth is much more interesting — after their defeat in WWII Japan was the occupied by the Allied Forces until 1952. The Allies (lead by the United States government) where keen to bring democracy to Japan. When it came to the fisheries, the Occupiers felt that every fisherman should be entitled to participate in the planning and management of their fishery. The Allied governance forced through the creation of the democratically inspired Fishery Coordination Committee, which allowed the Japanese fisherman to create a collective fishery management model, the precursor to the CBFM. CBFMs Are Already Here Maine is no stranger to CBFM programs. The Maine Lobsterman’s Association (MLA), established in 1954, is a perfect example. The MLA has facilitated a long relationship between local fisherman, their surrounding communities and the fishery. In 1995, at the urging of the MLA, the Maine Legislature enacted a co-management law dividing the Maine lobster fishery into seven lobster zones, managed by the lobster zone councils. The fishermen collaborate with the government by participating on the zone councils and aiding in the creation of new management practices. In Massachusetts, the Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector is another example of a working CBFM. The Hook Sector allows hook and line fishermen to be engaged in creating the rules and regulations that govern and protect the fishery. The Sector is allowed up to 20% of the TAC for Georges Bank cod, and the members determine how to harvest the cod. The Sector also provides opportunities for fishermen to work with scientists and observers to conduct research and monitor their bycatch, proving that they are capable of handling the responsibilities of management. According to the Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen’s Association, the Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector is a new concept that has, “done a great job in unifying fishermen in the area, connecting the community with the fishermen, promoting sustainable fishing practices and forming a bond of trust between fishermen and the scientific community.” In response to the massive decline in groundfish stocks off in the Bay of Fundy, Nova Scotia, the Marine Resource Centre (MRC) was created in 1997. The MRC’s “Local Stocks and Local Knowledge” project allowed fishermen and scientists to work together to protect fish spawning areas and protect the fishing communities. Alaska has two CBFM programs: the Community Development Quota program (CDQ) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands to provide economic development for the surrounding coastal communities, and the Community Entity Quota program (CEQ) for the rest of the State. Both are non-profit organizations. In the CDQ program, the communities receive a percentage of the total allowable catch (TAC) for all federally managed species in the area, including pollock and cod. Some of communities choose to lease their quota to larger vessels and corporations. The capitol earned goes back into the community creating a revenue stream for further economic development. In the CEQ program the community is not given a percentage of the TAC. Instead, the community must purchase IFQ (Individual Fishing Quotas) from the federal government at current market value, and lease it to individual community residents. Alaska’s halibut and sablefish fisheries are managed using (IFQs), purchased by individual fishermen. The CEQ program was established in order to protect small fishing communities from the consolidation resulting from IFQ programs. Currently there are four CEQ’s established in Alaska, but none have yet purchased quota. There is a very successful CBFM in Baja California, Mexico, just south of California and Arizona. Since 1940, the Regional Federation of Fishing Cooperatives (FEDECOOP), nine regional fishing cooperatives have manage fish stocks in the waters Baja, including lobster, abalone, conch, sea cucumber, sea urchin, algae and other marine organisms. The community members are responsible of preventing poaching as well as research projects on the fish stocks to protect breeding and spawning grounds and to monitor the success of management measures. Big Picture All of the CBFMs mentioned above emphasize the need for bottom-up rather than top-down approaches to manage small-scale fisheries. Fostering viable community-level organizations is the first step to effective CBFMs. Another key concept is the devolution of management authority to the community; establishment of territorial boundaries; and incentives and motivations to fishermen to set up local management system. In Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea, Solomon and Fiji, the establishment of territorial boundaries in the area adjacent to the community was a basic element for the success of the CBFM.The territorial boundaries gave the fishermen incentives to establish self-regulating systems. Compliance was built on trust. Control over resources by fishermen made management feasible – they were all motivated to preserve their resource. Numerous global studies have been done and there is now widespread acceptance of the concept that sharing of authority between a government and a community is important for effective fishery resource management. The basic principles of CBFM are participation of fishermen in (a) planning and decision-making; and (b) implementation, control, surveillance and evaluation of management activities. Studies have shown that when fishermen themselves help design the management program, a high rate of compliance can be expected. There is rarely a need for external enforcement of regulations; consequently, the enforcement is both effective as well as cost-effective. In a close-knit fishing community, social sanctions can be far more effective than legal sanctions. Many of the most successful CBFMs use concepts like “fishing by rotation” – the policy of rotating the most productive fishing spots among all of the fishermen so that all of them get to fish in the most fertile areas. “Pooling systems” another practice, distributes all earnings from the fishery equally among fishermen of that area. “Pooling” is the system that the Japanese have found to be the most effective. In Sri Lanka, fishermen also use Pooling, and return some of their earned money to the community by donating cash or a social facility. The development of co-operative marketing was also effective in supporting the CBFM. It strengthens the bargaining power of fishermen. The marketing can also be combined with management, with fishermen using market trends to decide when and how to fishing. So, while NOAA works to control the power from the top-down, small fishing communities around the world have found success when the power is bottom-up. |
