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Since the dawn of industrialized fishing fleets, the herring fishery has been spotted with disaster. From the North Sea to the North Pacific, herring stocks have collapsed under intense fishing pressure, and oftentimes despite the science of the day.

Herring are arguably the most important fish on the planet. They are a huge biomass converter in that they convert zooplankton to, basically, flesh. From there, they serve as a major prey for everything from seabirds to groundfish to humans.

But this degree of import comes with a price. As technology has improved and demand risen, herring stocks around the world have suffered, and many of them needlessly so.

The recommended TACs did not particularly reflect the long term advice.
One of the first major failures came in the 1950s, when the Norwegian winter herring fishery plummeted to complete collapse by 1957. Shortly afterward, on the other side of the globe, the Pacific herring fishery began running into severe trouble. The Canadian government finally closed the fishery in 1967. Following more stringent management, the stocks were recovered by the mid-70s, then experienced area-specific closures in 1983.

Both the Bering Sea and the North Sea experienced collapses in the 1970s, with the Bering Sea failing by 1972, and the North Sea suffering a total collapse and an entire fishery closure by 1978. The stocks returned, but by the mid-1990s rampant overfishing caused another collapse, which was followed by strict management measures in 1997. By 2003, the North Sea stock had recovered. Recovery is by degree, since it is not typically a 100% recovery but to some percentage of what the stock was before the collapse.

The Georges Bank fishery seemed to parallel that of the North Sea. Industrialized foreign fleets hit Georges Bank in the early 1960s, with the peak landings reaching 373,000 metric tons by 1968, and dropping to 43,500 by 1976. A complete collapse followed one year later. The Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 put an end to the foreign fleets' dominance, and the fishery revived.

The causes for these failures are multifaceted, but each of the collapses was the direct result of large-scale industrial fishing. In most of the cases, environmental factors, such as changes in the ocean environs, contributed. The 20th century was marked by a growing population and a wartime techno-industrial boom. With an ever-burgeoning herring market, and new and better ways of supplying that market, overfishing will occur—unless management steps in.

According to Mika Rahikainen, of the University of Helsinki: "Clupeoid [herring] populations have exhibited a general tendency to collapse under heavy fishing pressure, often in conjunction with environmental changes creating social, political, and ecological problems…"

In a report for the Centre of Fisheries Economics in Norway, authors Torbjorn Lorentzen and Rognvaldur Hannesson wrote: "The demise of the herring stocks in the 1960s and 70s is generally believed to have been the result of overfishing, which in turn was caused by major technological leaps…" These leaps, such as mechanical winches and fish finders, coincided with a fluctuating ocean climate.

A 2007 report in the ICES Journal of Marine Science, by John Simmonds of the FRS Marine Laboratory in Aberdeen, Scotland, compared the two North Sea collapses. Both collapses, he found, came despite some warnings. "The scientific advice was disputed," wrote Simmonds of the first North Sea crash, "and several requests and proposals were made for better science, but served only to delay decision-making."

The 1995 collapse came due to an oversized TAC, which was based on estimated stock size. "The recommended TACs," he wrote, "did not particularly reflect the long term advice."

"In 1967, Danish fisheries biologists complained that the exploitation of the North Sea herring was too intense, but their Norwegian colleagues didn't agree with that view," wrote Lorentzen and Hannesson.

Stocks fluctuate: that is natural. Things come and go. The herring populations have consistently rebounded from collapse, and done so quickly. Even the 1970s North Sea collapse, which resulted in near extinction according to Simmonds, was reversed with subdued fishing pressure. People, however, don't operate on the same scale as the sea, and collapses at sea often times have more resounding impacts on shore.

"The immediate consequence of the collapse of the herring stocks," wrote Lorentzen and Hannesson of the Norwegian coast, "was a severe decline in income and raw materials for the processing industry."

When an industry runs out of raw materials, the fishermen run out of work. In the case of the herring collapse in Norway, the fishermen found work on fish farms and in the oil industry, and in that way overfishing became one of the major forces behind the Norwegian aquaculture boom.

The fishermen, however, aren't the only ones who suffer. Not only do the coasts begin to change as traditional ways of life are ousted, but the industries themselves are destroyed. Large-scale or small-scale, mid-water trawler or weir fishermen, it doesn't matter. When the fish are gone the industry is gone.

The 1970s North Sea collapse was preceded by attempts to change the TAC, but regulations prohibited altering the TAC, and by the time it could be changed, it was too late. "In practice, a TAC would only be agreed to if it was unrestrictive," wrote Simmonds. "In response, some delegates cited short-term economic losses of reducing catches as the main reason that restrictions were unacceptable…and this tendency exists even today."

According to Simmonds, it is in the industry's economic interest to fish sustainably. The losses following a collapse last much longer than the losses associated with a reduced TAC. Simmonds: "The benefits to the industry of the value of the cumulative catch resulting from successful management of this large stock have been proven to outweigh by far the costs of obtaining good management advice."

Among Simmonds' messages to fisheries management is his notion that management decisions and actions could be aided by a "collective memory" of earlier collapses.

Lorentzen and Hannesson's report arrived at a similar conclusion: "In times past," they wrote, "people have had to cope with major changes in fish stocks associated with climate variability in the ocean. Some of these changes, in particular the herring collapses in the 1960s and 1970s, have been of a magnitude which is probably comparable to what might result from global warming and its impacts in the oceans."

Currently, the Gulf of Maine has a healthy herring stock that is not being overfished, according to NOAA scientists and Maine's Department of Marine Resources.

But many small-scale fishermen and conservationists express concerns that are reminiscent of historic collapses. Groups such as CHOIR, and the Herring Alliance (whose in-depth report can be read on their websight: herringalliance.org) say that the massive leaps that technology has taken may be detrimental to the fishery, and they worry that management and science may not be keeping up with those leaps. Further, the industrialized fleets have a powerful influence on governing bodies. They are able to employ lawyers and lobbyists who look out for their interests, and those interests are not always compatible with contemporary science.

Throughout history, herring have played a important role. They're a basic but valuable fish, one that people worldwide have sought after, fought over, needed and nearly destroyed for centuries. Today, the herring play as important a role as they ever have, and they are now a top priority for North Atlantic fisheries management. It is hoped that these managers are able to abide this "collective memory," and heed to caution when they must, thus keeping the future herring fishery as healthy and important as it is today.

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