ICCAT BLUEFIN TUNA MEETING 2006 from page 1                                January 2007  

ICCAT chairman Bill Hogarth (left) addressing members in the main conference room at the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, in Dubrovnick, Croatia in November, 2006. Dr Jerry Scott (right), chairman of SCRS (Standing Committee on Research and Statistics) made clear the need for closures. Together they represent the two most valuable offices in ICCAT. Photo:Rich Ruais
The U.S. was prepared to do serious battle over any challenge of the SCRS findings of impending eastern collapse and over the continuing damage to the western fishery stemming from the past decade of irresponsible non-management and gross overfishing in the east. Dr. Bill Hogarth contracted with Dr. Mike Sissenwine (former NMFS Chief Scientists) and Dr. Joe Powers (former SCRS Chairman/NMFS bluefin scientist) to back-up Dr. Clay Porch and SCRS Chairmen Dr. Jerry Scott as necessary. One could make an argument that no other country in the world could produce this level of Atlantic bluefin tuna stock structure/population assessment expertise available at any meeting. Dr. Alan Fonteneau (Past SCRS Chairmen/bluefin scientist) from France volunteered to attend the meeting to pressure the EC and France to accept the reality of the dire eastern stock situation.

The EC smartly decided against challenging the science. However, they opted for a more devious and contemptuous strategy of acknowledging the critical stock situation and advancing a sham of a so-called “emergency,” “coherent Recovery Plan” that openly and plainly ignores the science but claims to restore the stock. The “Plan” sets the target quota double the SCRS recommended level and ignores the imperative finding that, to be effective at stock protection, the spawning closure must include a major reduction in fishing during the month of June.

The EC leader John Spencer mocked the U.S. refusal to support any eastern plan not consistent with scientific advice and joked that our position was akin to “Kill Bill 3,” a disrespectful reference to Chairman Bill Hogarth’s steadfast stand on heeding scientific advice and the economic consequences of following the advice to reduce catches to 15,000 mt. Throughout the meeting, John Spencer criticized the western bluefin plan—particularly the fact that our 30 kg minimum size did not protect spawning sized fish—as inadequate in substance and detail. He also claimed that the EC proposal was “comprehensive” because that is the way “we like to do things.”

In any case, the new eastern “Recovery Plan” contains 57 separate provisions that, if implemented, would establish for the first time ever the infrastructure to monitor and control eastern fisheries—should the political will develop to comply with a plan anytime soon. What John Spencer is unaware of is that the western plan does not need to detail monitor and control measures because the U.S., Canada and Japan have had fishery management infrastructure and control in place for over 30 years. The EC has no experience with fishery management, as was betrayed the meetingby their initial proposal that the ICCAT Secretariat notify countries when 100% of their TAC was caught. They changed the proposal to 85% after they were educated that lead time is required unless one desires to guarantee consistent quota overages.

The new eastern “Recovery Plan” contains the following quotas in metric tons:

Total allowable catches:
2007  29,500
2008  28,500
2009  27,500
2010  25,500

In January ’07, ICCAT’s Panel 2 will hold a special three-day (or longer) meeting in Kobe, Japan to develop the allocation shares among eastern fishing countries. The EC failed to get agreement on how to split up the declining quota between competing nations such as Turkey, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and others. Some of the other major provisions for the east and Mediterranean agreed to at the Croatia meeting include:
  • the spawning closure for large scale longline vessels (>24 meters) will be extended from June 1 to December 3
  • purse seine closure will not start until after July (after the farms are fully supplied) and last through December 31
  • bait boats will be prohibited from fishing from Nov. 15 to May 15, as will midwater pelagic trawlers
  • minimum size is increased to 30kg with tolerance of 8% but not to include fish below 10kg; prohibition against any dead discards with all fish to be landed and counted against quota
  • prohibition on use of airplanes and helicopters searching for bluefin
  • recreational bag limit of one fish with no sale provision, suggestion that countries take steps to release all live recreationally caught fish
  • no carry-over of any under harvests shall be allowed under the “Recovery Plan” except for underages from 2005 and 06 of which 50% may be made
 • various measures to attempt to control and record farming production
• 20% observer requirement on purse seine, pelagic trawlers and longlines
• VMS for all vessels over 24 meters
• tail tags for the east Atlantic bait boat fisheries


Room where the U.S. delegation met twice daily. In the morning to plan for the daily session and in the afternoon to that review the session and plan for the next day. Photo:Rich Ruais
The U.S. forced a roll call vote on the eastern plan and lost by a 10 to 8 margin. The EC, and many other eastern parties, are clearly not yet willing to make the quota sacrifices necessary to rebuild the resource. They are counting on this new paper plan to buy time, relieve some of the pressure from the U.S. and environmental groups, and hope to reduce the prospect of a successful proposed CITES Listing (i.e. a ban on international trade of bluefin tuna). It is difficult to see how this plan can work and, unfortunately, our fishery is linked to the almost certain continuing ICCAT bluefin tuna failure.

Finally, in ICCAT’s Compliance Committee, the EC ignored the U.S. demand that the 54,000 mt in eastern bluefin tuna quota overages the last three years be addressed in some fashion and, at the very least, by appointment of a special review committee. They refused to even acknowledge this minimal request. This situation of some eastern nations being allowed to carry forward underages from the last two years while blatantly ignoring 54,000 in overages is outrageous, irresponsible and should be criminal. I cannot imagine this type of unfair trade situation being tolerated beyond an international fish product.

Western Bluefin Tuna
The SCRS assessment for western bluefin in 2006 was more pessimistic than the previous assessment largely because the 1994 and 1997 year classes are now believed to be only average in size. No doubt eastern catches of western fish have contributed to this new view of these year classes. The assessment continues to find the stock stable at a low level and not likely to change significantly with catches at 2,700 mt quota level. The advice also continued to point out the linkage of western stock productivity and western fishery performance to inadequate management in the east because of the mixing between east and west.

However, the SCRS advice also proposed a quota reduction from 2,700 to 2,100 mt, which would result in spawning stock biomass increases of about 1.5% per year for the next few years; and reduce fishing mortality to the FMSY level. Consistent with U.S. ICCAT policy since 1981, the U.S. supported the scientific advice and advanced a new agreement.

The new western quota of 2100 mt for 2007-08 represents about a 20% cut for the west and the U.S. share will be 1,190 mt down from the current quota of 1,489. Canada’s reduced quota will be 496 and Japan’s will be 380 mt. The new quotas will be inclusive of dead discards and this is a significant change. The U.S. will carry forward underage into 2007 that will likely minimize the quota cut for the following two years.

There are a few new provisions to the bluefin agreement. There is now a cap on the amount of rollover of underage and the limit is 50% of a nation’s base quota. This same cap applies for the swordfish agreement as well. Although we do not yet know the amount of 2006 rollover, clearly the U.S. under the 50% limit will be forfeiting uncaught quota built up over the last 3 years. The new agreement transferred 50 mt of U.S. underage to Canada for fishing years 2007 and 2008.

As expected, Mexico was exceptionally demanding at the meeting for bluefin tuna quota share. They demanded 220 mt of quota even knowing that the western quota was being cut by 600 mt for the foreseeable future. They let it be known that they were prepared to block any western agreement unless their quota demand was made. The U.S. initially opposed Mexico’s request and eventually countered with 10 tons for 2007-08. The Gulf of Mexico is closed to directed fishing and Mexico already has 25 tons for bycatch, so its not clear why they want so much quota unless they plan on violating prior agreements.

Mexico countered that they were transferring 9 small boats from the Pacific to fish the Atlantic and although we consistently pointed out the improbability of developing a south Atlantic/Caribbean directed bluefin fishery, Mexico ultimately held the U.S. up for 75 tons of underage in ‘07 and 100 tons of underage in ‘08. Provisions restricting the transfer of underage prohibit Mexico from fishing in the Gulf of Mexico and from trading the quota to another party. It appears that both prohibited activities are likely to happen and will not be reported unless they are caught.

Mexico will expect to receive an allocation of quota share equal to or greater than the 175 tons received this year and the U.S., Canada and Japan will have to be prepared to fight this fight in 2008. There is simply no reasonable justification for allowing major new players to develop when a stock is being rebuilt. The U.S. delegation will require State Department influence with Mexico prior to the next meeting to end or limit unreasonable expectations.

Another new provision in the 2006 agreement will allow any country to make a one time annual transfer of up to 15% of its allocation to another country subject to a restriction that it not to be used to cover prior quota overages, and that it not be re-transferred by the receiving country. This provision was included at the joint request of U.S. and Canada to make possible reciprocal fishing privileges in each respective country. Some initial discussions with Canadian government and bluefin industry were made at the meeting with the result being a commitment to further the discussions in early 2007 after a meeting between Dr. Hogarth and a Canadian Minister with authority to allow reciprocal fishing.

Finally, the western 8% tolerance on bluefin below the 30 kg minimum size was increased to 10% of the U.S. quota and this will allow continuing recreational opportunities under the reduced TAC.
Rich Ruais
Executive Director
Blue Water Fishermen’s Association
East Coast Tuna Association

homepagearchivessubscribeadvertising